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This paper examines the nature of mortgage credit rationing across geographic markets and 
time. Particular attention is paid to the response of conventional mortgage supply to higher risk 
conditions associated with regional recessions. We develop a series of four indirect tests based 
on the spatial variation of the FHA share of mortgages, both endorsements and applications, as 
well as FHA and conventional rejection rates. Results of these four tests indicate that 
conventional mortgage underwriting criteria do not become more flexible and may even become 
more demanding when local economic conditions deteriorate. This result indicates the use of 
non-price credit rationing in the mortgage market and suggests a special role for FHA-insured 
mortgages as a mechanism for maintaining mortgage credit supply in declining housing markets. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
                                                            
1 We thank Jan Brueckner, Charles Capone, Amy Crews-Cuts, Peter Linneman, Todd Sinai, the anonymous referees, 
and the seminar participants at the Fannie Mae Foundation and UC Berkeley for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 AREUEA Annual meeting. Partial financial 
support was provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and 
Research under contract DU100C000018441. Brent Ambrose acknowledges the support received by the Samuel Zell 
and Robert Lurie Real Estate Center Research Sponsors Program at the University of Pennsylvania. 
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In this paper, we test the nature and existence of non-price credit rationing in single-family 
residential mortgage markets in the United States by exploiting the institutional fact that 
conventional lenders, including private mortgage insurers (PMIs), are free to vary conventional 
underwriting criteria across spatial markets (but not within markets), whereas the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) imposes spatially uniform underwriting standards for all FHA-
insured mortgages.2 Thus, in originating FHA and conventional mortgages, lenders in spatially 
defined mortgage markets across the United States are free to alter conventional mortgage 
underwriting criteria to reflect changing economic conditions while also offering FHA-insured 
mortgages with uniform underwriting criteria. 
 
In areas experiencing an economic downturn, the risk of mortgage lending increases and the 
percentage of low-risk mortgage applicants falls. The resulting decline in demand for lower-risk 
conventional mortgages means that conventional lenders must cut prices if they are to maintain 
their market share in declining areas. Cutting price explicitly, in the form of lower mortgage rates 
or insurance fees, is inconsistent with observed price invariance over space.3  Thus, if 
conventional lenders attempt to maintain their market share in declining (higher risk) areas, they 
must do so by relaxing underwriting criteria. Alternatively, conventional lenders may maintain 
underwriting standards and allow their market share to fall as fewer applicants are able to 
qualify. We develop a number of indirect tests for non-price rationing by conventional lenders in 
response to local differences in economic conditions, based on the implications of that behavior 
for the relative shares of FHA and conventional mortgage activity.  
 
Recently expanded Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting requirements covering 
virtually all mortgage banking firms allow for the observation of spatial variation in patterns of 
applications, endorsements, and rejections for both conventional and FHA mortgages. 
Supplementing HMDA data with FHA internal records allows us to characterize the risk structure 
of FHA endorsements. Thus, for the first time, we can test a number of hypotheses concerning 
                                                            
2 The GAO [18] notes that, under FHA program guidelines, FHA mortgage underwriting criteria and premium 
structure do not deviate across geographic locations. Although conventional lenders and PMI maintain spatially 
uniform pricing structures (Duca and Rosenthal [8]), they may vary underwriting criteria spatially. The FHA may vary 
underwriting guidelines to a limited extent in response to Presidential decrees following natural disasters; however, 
these variations are highly localized. 
 
3 For a recent theoretical treatment that predicts a mortgage market equilibrium characterized by non-price rationing, 
see Brueckner [2]. Furthermore, Duca and Rosenthal [8] note that Fair Lending Laws make it difficult for lenders to 
differentially price applicants based on applicant risk 
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the nature of credit rationing by conventional mortgage lenders. We also find that substantial 
variation in the FHA’s share of mortgage activity persists even after adjusting for the effects of 
the FHA loan limits and for the institutional composition of local mortgage markets. 
 
We are not aware of any previous similar study of FHA market shares that considers the full 
range of applications, endorsements, and rejections analyzed here. However, there is a 
literature on FHA mortgage choice that relies on survey microdata from the American Housing 
Survey (AHS), the Survey of Consumer Finances, or similar surveys.4 Because these surveys 
examine relatively few new mortgages each year in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
studies using them cannot evaluate spatial variation in credit rationing behavior between FHA 
and conventional lenders. Indeed, these studies implicitly assume that underwriting criteria do 
not vary spatially. 
 
We devise a series of tests designed to detect the nature of credit rationing for conventional 
mortgages in spatially distinct mortgage markets, specifically MSAs. In contrast to other studies, 
we take advantage of the unique position of the FHA as a specialized high-cost, high-risk, 
spatially invariant insurance program in constructing our tests. Appropriate tests for the nature 
of credit rationing in mortgage markets require examination of the way in which a number of 
market indicators, in addition to FHA market share, vary with risk. Accordingly, we first present a 
model of market responses to shifting MSA credit risk conditions and then perform a number of 
tests based on this model. The empirical results are consistent with the findings of Duca and 
Rosenthal [7] and indicate that FHA market shares increase as economic uncertainty increases. 
Taken together, these tests provide a substantial indication of the role of spatial risk differentials 
and credit rationing by conventional lenders in mortgage lending. 
 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING 
 
Following Hendershott et al. [12], we assume homebuyers recognize that the cost of FHA 
mortgage insurance relative to the cost of private mortgage insurance (PMI) varies based on 
loan-to-value and other characteristics, with conventional PMI being more (less) expensive for 
                                                            
4 For example, a number of researchers, including Linneman and Wachter [13], Gabriel and Rosenthal [10], 
Goodman and Nichols [11], and Hendershott et al. [12] have used microdata on individual households to study the 
choice between conventional and government-insured mortgages. 
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borrowers seeking high (low) loan-to-value mortgages.5 Accordingly, applicants trade off 
constraints on house value and higher required down payments for the lower cost of 
conventional mortgages. These arguments are part of an established theoretical literature 
backed by empirical testing using microdata on individual households.6 Goodman and Nichols 
[11] introduce the term “FHA wedge” to describe the group of applicants whose loan-to-value 
ratio is between 95% and 100% and/or have a front end ratio between 28% and 33%. Such 
applicants are very likely to be rejected for conventional mortgages but are likely to qualify 
for FHA-insured mortgages. 
 
Following an approach used by Ferguson and Peters [9], we assume that all relevant 
information concerning the applicant’s ability to qualify for a mortgage, including credit history, 
collateral quality, and loan terms, can be quantified by a “mortgage credit score.” Credit risk, Φ, 
is a monotonically increasing function that captures the borrower’s probability of default.7  Each 
lender sets uniform underwriting standards such that all applicants with a credit risk above a 
minimum acceptable risk level, Φ∗, are rejected, whereas all applicants with a credit risk below  
Φ∗ are accepted. The marginal probability density function of an applicant’s risk is ݎሺΦሻ, and 
ܴሺΦሻis the cumulative density function. 
 
The probability that a borrower applies for a FHA mortgage is a function of both the borrower’s 
credit risk (Φ) and the lenders’ conventional underwriting standards (Φେ). Households with Φ 
significantly below Φେ are very likely to choose lower-cost conventional mortgages. However, 
some households, fearing possible rejection for conventional loans, apply for FHA insurance, 
although their credit risk is below the conventional standard (Φ ൏ Φେ), whereas other 
households, less concerned with possible rejection than with insurance cost, apply for 
conventional loans with Φ ൐ Φେ. Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] demonstrate that although 
the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of credit scores reported by the Fair, Isaac and 
Company (FICO) for FHA and conventional borrowers have considerable overlap, the 
                                                            
5 For borrowers with high loan-to-value mortgages (greater than 95%), FHA insurance premiums are lower than PMI 
premiums. For borrowers at the 95% LTV cutoff, the relative cost advantage or disadvantage of FHA over PMI 
depends upon a number of factors, including whether the applicant qualifies for the first-time home buyer credit or the 
central city discount credit rationing 
 
6 See Linneman and Wachter [13], Gabriel and Rosenthal [10], Zorn [20], Sa-Aadu and Sirmans [16], Goodman and 
Nichols [11], and Hendershott et al. [12]. 
 
7 We normalize Φ such that Φ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. 
 5  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, Yezer 
 
probability of applying to FHA decreases monotonically with increasing FICO scores. Thus, if we 
assume that Φ can be interpreted as the inverse of the credit score, then we can define 
ߙሺΦ;Φେሻ as the share of FHA applicants at a given risk level indexed by Φ, given current 
conventional lending standards (Φେ) Thus, ߙሺΦ;Φେሻ is an increasing function of Φ. Following 
Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15], we note that because mortgage insurance charges for 
lower-risk conventional mortgages are generally lower than FHA insurance rates, ߙሺΦ;Φେሻ is 
approximately 0 when Φ ≪ Φେ and increases monotonically until it equals unity at some 
value	Φ̓, where Φେ ൏ Φ̓ ൏ Φ୊ and Φ୊ is the upper limit of credit risk acceptable to the FHA. 
 
We consider the case of a spatially defined, local market where lenders offer both conventional 
and government-insured (FHA) mortgage products.8 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of 
applicant outcomes in this market. The marginal density function of credit risk ݎሺΦሻ is drawn, 
reflecting the empirical fact noted by Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] that the peak of the 
marginal density function falls at a level of credit risk less than the maximum credit risk 
acceptable given conventional underwriting standards, indicated by Φେ. 
 
We note that the fraction of all applicants who apply for an FHA mortgage, ܣሺΦେሻ, given that the 
risk distribution of the population is characterized by 
ܴሺΦሻ, is given by 
 
ܣሺΦେሻ ൌ ׬ ݎሺΦሻߙሺΦ;Φେሻ݀Φ.ଵ଴    (1) 
 
In Fig. 1, the value of Aሺ∙ሻ is given by S ൅T ൅ V. The fraction of all mortgage applications that 
result in an endorsed FHA mortgage, ܧሺΦେ;Φ୊ሻ is 
 
ܧሺΦେ;Φ୊ሻ ൌ ׬ ݎ஍ూ଴ ሺΦሻߙሺߔ;Φେሻ݀Φ   (2) 
 
The value of Eሺ∙ሻ is given by S ൅ T in Fig. 1. The fraction of all mortgage applications resulting 
in denial of FHA mortgage insurance, ܦሺΦେ;Φ୊ሻ, is 
 
                                                            
8 The two loan products may either be offered by different lenders or, more likely, by a single lender. Applicants select 
the type of product that they prefer. Institutionally, it is often true that loan underwriting is segmented by loan product. 
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ܦሺΦେ;Φ୊ሻ ൌ ׬ 	ݎଵ஍ూ ሺΦሻߙሺΦ;Φେሻ݀Φ   (3) 
 
The region V in Fig. 1 represents D(	∙	). Similar relations can be developed for shares of 
applications, endorsements, and denials for conventional lenders, recognizing that their share of 
applications for individuals with credit risk Φ is simply	ሾ1 െ ߙሺΦ;Φେሻሿ. 
 
All applicants with credit risk Φ greater than Φେ are rejected for conventional mortgages, either 
by the lender or by the mortgage insurer. We assume that the lender can vary conventional 
underwriting standards, Φେ, whereas the FHA has fixed underwriting standards, Φ୊. Thus, we 
can test whether various market shares change differentially, depending on the flexibility of 
conventional underwriting standards. Although we are not able to observe the actual credit risk  
(ݎሺΦሻ)distribution, we know that most applicants succeed in qualifying for conventional loans 
and have an incentive to provide credit enhancements, principally an additional down payment, 
to qualify for lower-cost PMI.9 Other applicants are unable to provide these enhancements, and 
they fall into the shaded region T in Fig. 1 between Φେ and Φ୊, known as the “FHA wedge.” 
This is the portion of the distribution of applications that would be rejected by conventional 
lenders and accepted by FHA.10 
 
We are interested in the effects of a shift in credit risk due to changing economic conditions. A 
downturn in the local economy causes the probability density function of applicant risk ݎሺΦሻ to 
shift to ݎᇱሺΦሻ. Thus, ݎᇱሺΦሻ reflects an increase in risk in that ܴᇱ(Φ)൏ ܴሺΦሻ∀Φ. We follow 
Ferguson and Peters [9] in defining an increase in risk as a shift in the risk distribution of 
mortgage applicants such that ܴᇱሺΦሻ first order stochastically dominates (FOSD)	ܴሺΦሻ. 
 
We develop testable hypotheses about the differential effects of alternative responses of 
conventional lenders to increases in credit risk that result when ݎሺΦሻ shifts to	ݎᇱሺΦሻ, where 
ݎᇱሺΦሻ FOSD ݎሺΦሻ. Specifically, we form a series of testable hypotheses that allow us to 
determine the effects of changes in the underwriting criteria of conventional lenders and PMI 
underwriters in response to increases in local economic risk on (1) the FHA share of 
                                                            
9 In fact, many borrowers put just enough down to qualify for conventional financing, thus producing a hump at the 
conventional lending limit. 
10 In essence, these are the applications for which FHA has no competition—the modest share of the FHA wedge 
applying for conventional credit and being rejected possibly reflects imperfect information on the part of applicants. 
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applications, (2) the FHA share of originations, (3) the FHA rejection rate, and (4) the 
conventional rejection rate.11 Each of these four tests can be rigorously derived based on an 
analysis of Eqs. (1)–(3).12 
 
First, consider the case where conventional lenders do not alter underwriting standards in 
response to an increase in local economic risk. Figure 2 shows this market equilibrium in which 
Φେ is constant, i.e., conventional underwriting criteria are inflexible, or lenders engage in 
complete non-price rationing. When Φେ remains constant and ݎሺΦሻ shifts to ݎᇱሺΦሻ, where 
ݎᇱሺΦሻ FOSD ݎሺΦሻ, then ݎሺΦሻߙሺΦ,Φେሻ increases monotonically. It follows that the FHA share 
of applicants, ܣሺΦେሻ, and the FHA share of originations, ܧሺΦେ,Φ୊ሻ, increase accordingly. 
Because the FHA underwriting criteria are constant, the effect on the FHA rejection rate is 
ambiguous, because both the share of FHA applicants and the number of FHA rejections 
increase. This leads to a counterintuitive result—that as the risk distribution increases, the FHA 
rejection rate does not necessarily increase as well. However, because conventional 
underwriting criteria remain constant in response to an increase in local risk, conventional 
endorsements will be lower while the FHA wedge increases. Thus, our theory predicts that the 
conventional rejection rate will rise.13 
 
Now consider the case where conventional lenders relax their underwriting standards in 
response to an increase in local economic risk, as illustrated in Figure 3. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the Government-Sponsored Enterprises’ (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) 
charters to maintain mortgage credit in declining markets. Furthermore, conventional lenders 
have a high ratio of fixed to variable cost, suggesting that they would lower prices (i.e., relax 
underwriting standards) to maintain market share in the face of falling demand. It is important to 
recognize that increasing credit risk appears to the conventional lender as a decline in demand 
because the number of qualified mortgage applicants falls. The impact on the FHA’s share of 
                                                            
11 Because part of the mission of FHA is the maintenance of mortgage supply in declining markets, Φ୊ should not 
change because of changes in local economic risks. Weicher [19] notes that, as a result of the dramatic increase in 
mortgage defaults during the Great Depression, Congress created the FHA to help restore stability to the housing 
finance system. Subsequently this role has been interpreted as requiring that the FHA maintain the supply of 
mortgage credit in geographically concentrated recessions by providing mortgage insurance when local economic 
conditions deteriorate, and particularly by ignoring risks associated with falling home prices. 
 
12 A formal derivation is available from the authors upon request. 
 
13 This result rests upon the assumption that the peak of the applicant risk distribution is less than Φେ, which is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15]. 
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applications is ambiguous, because both ݎሺΦሻߙሺΦ;Φେሻ and Φେ are shifting. However, the 
increase in Φେ will reduce the FHA share of originations. The reasoning is as follows: if 
conventional lenders increase Φେ to maintain their market share, and if total applications are 
unchanged, and if the FOSD condition ensures that the number of FHA rejections increases 
(because Φ୊ does not change), then FHA originations must fall by the same amount by which 
the number of FHA rejections rises. Similarly, if the number of FHA rejections increases and 
FHA originations fall, then the FHA rejection rate must rise. Finally, we note that the effect of 
increasing Φେ on the conventional rejection rate is ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes the 
predicted effects on applications, originations, and rejection rates by an increase in local 
economic risk under the two scenarios for conventional lender reaction to a decline in demand. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR THE NATURE OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING 
 
Table 2 reports the geographic variation in the FHA share of FHA-eligible mortgages, i.e., those 
meeting the maximum mortgage limit. Market shares are calculated from information contained 
in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database, from which we identify FHA-eligible 
loans as either (1) FHA-insured originations and applications for owner-occupied home 
purchase loans, excluding refinancing, or (2) conventional (excluding Veterans Administration 
and Farmers Home Administration loans) originations and applications for owner-occupied 
home purchase loans, excluding refinancing, that meet the FHA loan limits.14 15 The market 
shares are calculated for 307 MSAs, and population-weighted averages are computed for the 
respective HUD Regions during the 1995–1996 period for which extended HMDA coverage is 
available. Given that the FHA loan limit varies across MSAs, the loan amount needed for FHA 
eligibility is county specific.16 Standard deviations reflect MSA deviations in FHA share within 
                                                            
14 The dataset contains all FHA-eligible conventional loans as identified by HMDA, including 
those originated by subprime lenders. However, because the analysis is confined to purchase mortgage loans (not 
refinance loans), the number of subprime loans in the dataset is extremely small (approximately less than 1%). 
 
15 Because FHA loan limits vary within each year, we use the weighted average loan limit, where the weight is the 
number of months the limit is in force, as indicated by a HUD Mortgagee Letter or the Federal Register. 
 
16 The FHA defines loan limits by MSA and country, grouped into high and standard cost areas. All standard cost 
areas have the same loan limit, whereas all high-cost areas, whether a county or MSA, have a more lenient loan limit. 
For most high-cost areas, the loan limit is defined as 95% of the median house price, but substantial local office 
discretion is allowed in setting the 95% loan limits. This 95% rule holds until it is greater than 75% of the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) loan limit, at which point the FHA loan limit is reset to 75% of the 
FHLMC loan limit. All loans in the HMDA data set that have a county identifier are included as part of the FHA market 
if the loan is less than or equal to the loan limit set for the county. 
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each HUD Region. Geographic divergences, other than the large Rocky Mountain share, are 
modest, as are differences over time. The differences by MSA within each state are more 
dramatic, sometimes exceeding a factor of 10.17 This is significant because many aspects of the 
institutional and regulatory environment governing mortgage markets are essentially uniform 
within a state. These very substantial differences in the FHA share of FHA-eligible mortgages 
remain to be explained. 
 
To test the hypotheses outlined above, we calculate four alternative share variables: (1) FHA 
share of total FHA-eligible mortgage loans originating in MSA i in year t, (2) FHA share of all 
applications for FHA-eligible mortgage loans originating in MSA i in year t, (3) the FHA rejection 
rate, and (4) the conventional rejection rate for FHA-eligible loans. Based on the comparative 
static results from the previous section, we examine the nature of geographic variation in these 
market shares by estimating a series of reduced-form models that fit the generic form 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥ௜௧		 ൅ 	ߚଶ	 ଵܲ ൅ ߚଷܯଵ	 ൅	ߚସ	ܮ௜௧ିଵ 	൅ ߚହܪ௜	 ൅ ߚ଺ܶ	 ൅ ߝ௜௧̓, 
 
where ௜ܻ௧ is a vector of various “share” variables (explained above) across i = 307 MSAs and t = 
2 years (1995 and 1996), the ߚ௝ ’s are vectors of parameters to be estimated, ܥ௜௧	is a vector of 
variables reflecting cyclical economic conditions in the MSA economy, ௜ܲ	is a vector of relatively 
permanent indicators of MSA economic conditions, ܯ௜௧ is a vector of variables indicating 
characteristics of the minority population, ܮ௜௧ିଵis a vector of lender share variables indicating 
the fraction of mortgage originations made by different types of institutions in the previous year, 
ܪ௜ is a vector of HUD regional dummies, T is a time dummy indicating observations from 1995, 
and ߝ௜௧ is an identically and independently distributed random error term. Table 3 contains a 
listing of all variables used in the model along with descriptive statistics. 
 
Because the market shares ( ௜ܻ௧) are proportions of a population, they should be treated as 
grouped observations. With grouped data, the unconditional variance is		ܻ݅ݐ	ሺ1 െ ܻ݅ݐሻ/ܰ݅ݐ	, 
where ௜ܰ௧ is the number of observed events in MSA i in year t used to calculate 	 ௜ܻ௧ . As a result, 
the efficiency of the estimator of β is underestimated. Because the market shares are based on 
different numbers of observations in each MSA, the variance of the estimates differs by MSA 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
17 Results are available upon request. 
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depending on ௜ܰ௧ . To control for this difference in variances, we estimate Eq. (10) via maximum 
likelihood as a logistic probability model with unscaled weighting, where ௜ܰ௧ is the weighting 
variable. This procedure often produces very small standard errors, leading to large t -statistics, 
suggesting statistical significance. We also report the marginal effects to infer economic impact. 
 
3.1. Cyclical Risk Factors 
 
To capture the shifts in the risk density function we include several variables designed to 
measure cyclical changes in economic risk associated with a particular MSA, including 
measures of housing, labor, and lending market conditions. Specifically, the local cyclical risk 
measures include the change in local house prices, the change in unemployment, and the 
percentage change in delinquent bank loans. Yearly changes ሺ∆ܪܲሻ in house prices are 
estimated from the Freddie Mac MSA Repeat Sales Index. Empirical studies of credit risk have 
demonstrated a negative relation between house price appreciation and default loss (see 
Capozza et al. [4], Deng and Calhoun [6], and Ambrose and Capone [1]). 
 
On average, local area house prices increased by 4.3% over the previous year. However, wide 
variation exists across the country, ranging from a 7.1% decline (Honolulu, HI) to a 12.6% 
increase (Provo–Orem, UT) over the previous year. Cyclical changes in the labor market are 
measured by the yearly change in the local unemployment rate ሺ∆ܷሻ, with increases in the 
unemployment rate indicating areas experiencing labor market distress. As with the housing 
market, borrower credit risk deteriorates in areas experiencing local recessions, and thus FHA 
market share should be higher in areas with increasing unemployment rates. Even during this 
period of generally robust economic conditions, many MSAs experienced a dramatic increase in 
unemployment rate. 
 
To measure cyclical changes in the local creditworthiness of applicants, we include the 
percentage change in delinquency rate of bank loans in the previous year ሺ∆ܦܧܮሻ as reported 
by the American Bankers Association.18 The delinquency rate is reported by state and includes 
all consumer loans (e.g., credit cards and personal lines of credit). Thus, we anticipate that FHA 
market share should increase in areas experiencing higher levels of financial stress. 
                                                            
18 Clauretie and Herzog [5] show that state foreclosure laws vary across states and do affect mortgage losses. 
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3.2. Permanent Risk Factors 
 
To measure the different shapes and positions of risk density functions across MSAs we include 
long-term measures of housing, employment, and demographic factors. For instance, MSAs 
with lower historical variation in the Freddie Mac repeat sales index, indicating more stable rates 
of house price change, are expected to be perceived as lower-risk areas. Because the cyclical 
risk factor ሺ∆ܪܲሻcontrols for the house price appreciation trend, we use its standard deviation, 
or ߪ∆ு௉, to measure the volatility of the average growth rate of house prices. Greater volatility is 
associated with greater credit risk. A variety of institutional factors, including state laws 
governing bankruptcy and foreclosure, influence local credit risk. We incorporate a measure of 
these effects in the form of the average default rate for the previous 6 years for each state 
൫ܦܧܮ௧൯. 
 
Based on previous research, we expect credit risk to be higher in areas with higher proportions 
of younger, lower-income households. We incorporate two income variables measuring these 
demographic characteristics associated with credit risk. One is the percentage of home buyers 
with income less than $20,000 (INC < 20). As the percentage of lower-income home buyers 
increases, we expect a permanent increase in credit risk among mortgage applicants.  
 
On average, 11% of home buyers fall into this category. However, the fraction of lower-income 
home buyers ranges from 0.2% (Nassau–Suffolk, NY) to over 30% (Sumter, SC). The other is 
the percentage of loans where the ratio of the loan amount to borrower income is greater than 
three (LTI > 3), which identifies areas with high house prices relative to income levels.19 On 
average, 5.7% of home buyers are classified as income constrained by this measure. Again, 
wide variation exists in this measure ranging from a minimum of 0.1% (Wichita Falls, TX) to a 
minimum of 51.5% (Honolulu, HI). As the fraction of the FHA-eligible market with LTI > 3 
increases, we expect the risk probability density function to shift to the right. 
 
3.3. Minority Population 
 
                                                            
19 As a data quality control check, we follow Bunce and Scheessele [3] and exclude all loans with LTV greater than 6. 
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Previous research has indicated that the FHA tends to differentially serve minority borrowers.20 
Accordingly, we include variables reflecting the percentage of minority applicants and the extent 
of housing market segregation. Using HMDA, we calculate the percentage of loan applications 
under the FHA loan limit by black applicants (BLACK). The fraction of black applicants averages 
6% and ranges from 0 (Dubuque, IA; Eau Claire, WI; Billings, MT; Bismark, ND; Laredo, TX; 
Medford, OR; Rapid City, SD; Wausau, WI) to 42.5% (Sumter, SC). We also incorporate a proxy 
for the level of local segregation (BGINI) to determine whether the FHA market share varies 
depending on the level of racial segregation. BGINI measures the spatial distribution of different 
groups across the local region and is derived from the Lorenz curve with values between 0.0 
and 1.0, with 1.0 indicating maximum segregation (see Massey and Denton [14]).21 For our 
sample, we find that the average MSA has a BGINI coefficient of 0.3, ranging from a minimum 
of 0.03 (Burlington, VT) to a maximum of 0.77 (Gary, IN). 
 
3.4. Lender Share Variables 
 
Finally, the variety of types of firms offering mortgage credit in the local market may have a 
direct effect on FHA market share of FHA-eligible mortgages. We capture the wide variety of 
lending institution types with a series of variables reflecting the government agencies collecting 
mortgage activity from lenders. For example, mortgage bankers, who report their mortgage 
activity to HUD, have historically had a closer association with FHA than with depository 
institutions, which report to a variety of regulatory agencies, including the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Thus, we include the percentage of loans 
originated that were reported to HUD (mortgage bankers), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the 
National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with the 
percentage of loans reported to HUD serving as the reference variable in the regression 
analysis. We note that substantial variation exists in the types of lenders originating mortgages 
in local markets. For example, the percentage of lenders reporting to HUD ranges from 3.7% 
                                                            
20 For example, see Shear and Yeser [17] for a discussion of the attractiveness of FHA to minority borrowers. 
 
21 BGINI is calculated from the 1990 census block data. 
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(Enid, OK) to 74.0% (Bakersfield, CA). In addition, banks and thrifts originate a large segment of 
loans, since lenders reporting to either the OCC or OTS originate 38.5% of all loans. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
We summarize the hypotheses and empirical findings concerning the effect of an increase in 
local credit risk on FHA shares of applications, originations, and FHA and conventional rejection 
rates in Table 1. Estimation results are presented in Table 4, and marginal effects are presented 
in Table 5. Marginal effects are calculated by evaluating the first derivatives of the respective 
shares with respect to each independent variable evaluated at the overall means of the data. 
Thus, the marginal effects provide an indication of the effects that a one-unit change in the 
respective variables will have on the expected market shares. Because our primary interest is in 
variables reflecting changes in cyclical and permanent risk, we examine these effects in turn. 
 
4.1. Cyclical Risk 
 
Recall that increasing cyclical risk associated with a downturn in the local economy is measured 
by increases in unemploymentሺ∆ܷሻ, increases in state level bank credit card delinquencies 
ሺ∆ܦܧܮሻ, and declines in the percentage change in house prices in the current or previous year 
(∆ܪ ௧ܲ, or ∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ). We first examine the impact of an increase in cyclical risk on FHA and 
conventional rejection rates. Consistent with the view that the FHA does not alter its 
underwriting standards to reflect changes in local economic risk, we see that an increase in 
cyclical risk certainly does not raise FHA rejection rates and may even lower them. Of the four 
cyclical risk variables, only the coefficients capturing changes in house prices are significant, but 
they have opposite signs. In addition, the marginal effects for changes in house prices indicate 
that these factors essentially offset one another in the FHA rejection model. As discussed above, 
this apparently counterintuitive effect of local cyclical risk indicators on FHA rejection rates 
strongly suggests that lenders do not relax conventional underwriting standards in response to 
an increase in risk. 
 
Turning to the conventional rejection rate model, we also find mixed results for the variables 
proxying for cyclical risk. Again, the variables for the changes in house prices have opposite 
signs, whereas the conventional rejection rate is positively related to increases in 
unemployment but negatively related to increases in the delinquency rate. Overall, the marginal 
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effects indicate that factors associated with an increase in cyclical risk largely offset one another. 
These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that lenders maintain underwriting 
standards, which predicted a positive effect on conventional rejection rates in response to an 
increase in local risk. 
 
Comparing the FHA and conventional rejection rate models, we find that the marginal effects on 
the estimated coefficients of variables capturing differences in cyclical risk in the FHA rejection 
rate model are smaller than the corresponding marginal effects for the conventional rejection 
rate model. For example, changes in the cyclical risk variables produce a shift between 0.16% 
ሺ∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵሻand 1.37% ሺ∆ܦܧܮሻ in the conventional rejection rate, whereas similar changes in 
cyclical risk variables only result in an 0.08% to 0.11% change in the FHA rejection rate. This 
indicates that the FHA rejection rate is relatively less sensitive to changes in the local economic 
environment than is the conventional rejection rate. 
 
Turning to the share equations, it appears that increasing cyclical risk is generally associated 
with an increase in the FHA share of originations and applications. For example, the marginal 
effects show that a 1% decline in the percentage change in the local house price index in the 
current and previous years results, respectively, in a 0.42% and 0.55% increase in the baseline 
FHA share of originations. In addition, a 1% increase in the yearly percentage change in the 
unemployment rate and delinquency rate results, respectively, in a 0.33% and 0.59% increase 
in the baseline FHA share of originations. With the exception of the change in the 
unemployment rate, we find similar effects for the FHA share of applications. Thus, the marginal 
effects for cyclical risk factors indicate that FHA market shares of FHA-eligible originations and 
applications do vary substantially with economic conditions. Taken together, the results for 
cyclical risk factors for FHA applications and originations are consistent with the hypothesis that 
conventional lenders do not lower lending standards to maintain their market share in response 
to increases in cyclical risk. 
 
4.2. Permanent Risk 
 
Turning to variables reflecting changing permanent risk, we begin by observing that the most 
attractive indicator of permanent differences in credit risk is the standard deviation in the trend 
rate of appreciation in house prices ሺߪ∆ு௉ሻ. The conventional rejection rate and FHA share of 
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originations both vary directly with this indicator of risk, whereas the FHA rejection rate varies 
inversely with it. This is strongly consistent with the non-price rationing hypothesis. 
 
Expanding our attention to the full set of permanent risk variables, we find that areas with higher 
historic average delinquency rates have a higher FHA market presence and higher conventional 
rejection rates. The marginal effects indicate that historic delinquency rates play a large role in 
altering FHA market shares and conventional rejection rates, confirming our prior expectations 
concerning the effect of area risk on market share. For example, in New York–New Jersey, an 
increase of one standard deviation in the historic delinquency rate translates into a 5-point 
increase in FHA originations and application market shares. Furthermore, we find that a higher 
permanent house price or equity risk is uniformly associated with higher FHA shares of both 
applications and originations, which is consistent with the hypothesis that lenders do not alter 
conventional underwriting behavior. 
 
Turning to the FHA rejection rate model, we find economically weaker effects for our variables 
proxying for areas with higher permanent risk than in the conventional rejection rate model. As 
with the cyclical risk factors, this result is consistent with spatial uniformity of FHA underwriting 
standards across geographic markets. 
 
Table 6 presents simulation results showing the effect of a significant increase in cyclical and 
permanent risk on FHA market share. Part A reports the baseline regional FHA market shares 
for HUD reporting financial institutions. As expected, there is a wide variation in FHA market 
shares across HUD regions. Part B simulates a short-term shock to the local economy by 
increasing ∆ܷ and ∆ܦܧܮ by one standard deviation (simulating an increase in unemployment 
and mortgage delinquency) and reducing ∆ܪ ௧ܲand reducing ∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ by one standard deviation 
(simulating a decline in property values). The results indicate an overall increase in FHA market 
shares of originations and applications corresponding to a reduction in credit from conventional 
lenders. Consistent with predictions from the marginal effects, we find that shifts in cyclical risk 
factors appear to have a minimal impact on rejection rates. Part C shows the effect of an 
increase in the permanent risk level for an area (permanent risk factors are increased by one 
standard deviation), holding all other factors constant. Again, FHA market shares for 
originations increase, but slightly less so than for a shock to cyclical risk factors. We also note 
that FHA rejection rates decline slightly, whereas conventional rejection rates increase. As 
summarized in Table 1, the empirical findings generally support the hypothesis that 
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conventional lenders hold underwriting standards constant and fail to support the hypothesis 
that conventional lenders relax underwriting standards to maintain their market share during 
periods of increased risk. 
 
4.3. Minority Effects 
 
It is interesting to note that as the percentage of minority households that apply for mortgages in 
an area increases, the FHA market share of both originations and applications increases along 
with rejection rates. The effects for the fraction of mortgage loans with black applicants might 
have been anticipated based on the literature, suggesting that FHA insurance is differentially 
attractive to minorities. Specifically, the marginal effects show that a 1% increase in the fraction 
of black applicants in the previous year (ܤܮܣܥܭ௧ିଵ) raises the baseline FHA market share of 
applications and originations by 0.54% and 0.45%, respectively. This indicates that low-risk 
black applicants are more likely to choose FHA insurance, perhaps fearing rejection for 
conventional mortgages or steering by real estate brokers or loan officers, or believing that the 
FHA program offers an unbiased source of mortgage credit. The direct relation between FHA 
and conventional rejection rates and the fraction of black applicants may reflect the higher 
rejection rates experienced by minorities. However, the effects of our index of segregation of the 
MSA residential population (BGINI) fail to reinforce the black percentage effects. Specifically, 
MSAs with a more segregated population (higher BGINI) tend to have lower rejection rates for 
conventional loans and lower FHA market shares of applications and originations. 
 
4.4. Regional and Financial Institution Effects 
 
The main contribution of the estimated coefficients of the HUD regional dummy variables is to 
demonstrate that, even after taking into account variables reflecting cyclical and permanent 
components of credit risk, minority composition, and the composition of lenders active in the 
mortgage market, substantial geographic variation in FHA shares and rejection rates remains. In 
part, this geographic variation may result from differential effectiveness of the HUD field offices 
located in each region. Consistent with the FHA market shares reported in Table 1, we see that 
the Rocky Mountain and Northwest regions have the highest FHA market shares after 
controlling for area risk factors. It is interesting to note that, although the Great Plains region has 
one of the lowest FHA market shares, after controlling for area risk factors this region has a 
significantly higher market share. 
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The institutional market structure variables generally behave as expected. Given that the 
lenders and mortgage originators reporting their lending activity to HUD are the reference group, 
the FHA share of FHA-eligible originations should fall as the percentage of loans originated by 
lenders reporting to other institutions rises. Thus, we see that FHA market shares of FHA-
eligible originations and applications are lower as the percentage of mortgages originated by 
institutions that report to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
increases. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper builds on existing literature on the microfoundations of choice between conventional 
and FHA-insured mortgages. We formulate a model of the effects of location-specific variation in 
credit risk on FHA market share. Our model allows us to utilize the FHA’s policy of ignoring 
geographic variation in credit risk to explore the nature and effects of credit rationing by 
conventional lenders. 
 
Based on this theory, and using a combination of HMDA data recently expanded in terms of 
coverage to include most FHA lenders and data from the FHA system itself, we estimate a 
series of four simple reduced-form models: FHA share of applications and originations, and FHA 
and conventional rejection rates. Taken together, these indirect tests strongly suggest that 
conventional mortgage lending criteria are not relaxed in areas experiencing recession or 
longer-term decline. Instead, conventional underwriting criteria are either maintained or 
tightened in the face of local recession, and FHA and conventional shares respond accordingly. 
Apparently conventional mortgage suppliers reject the possibility of relaxing underwriting criteria 
and raising mortgage insurance prices to preserve market share in declining areas. For home 
buyers seeking housing priced at or below the recently increased FHA maximum mortgage 
amount, FHA insurance is available to maintain mortgage credit supply during recessions or 
longer declines. For housing priced significantly above the FHA mortgage limit, the effects of 
non-price rationing of conventional mortgages may be more pronounced. 
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We also find that the composition of lenders active in the market and the racial composition of 
the MSA have an impact on FHA market share. These results should not surprise those familiar 
with the literature on the role of FHA. Finally, it appears that there is considerable geographic 
variation in FHA market share remaining to be explained in future research. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
1. B. W. Ambrose and C. A. Capone, Jr., Modeling the conditional probability of foreclosure 
in the context of single-family mortgage default resolutions, Real Estate Economics, 26, 
391–429 (1998). 
 
2. J. Brueckner, Mortgage default with asymmetric information, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 20, 251–274 (2000). 
 
3. H. Bunce and R. Scheessele, The GSEs’ funding of affordable loans, U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development Working Paper No. HF-001 (1996). 
 
4. D. Capozza, D. Kazarian, and T. Thomson, Mortgage default in local markets, Real 
Estate Economics, 25, 631–656 (1997). 
 
5. T. M. Clauretie and T. Herzog, The effect of state foreclosure laws on loan losses—
evidence from the mortgage insurance industry, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
22, 221–233 (1990). 
 
6. Y. Deng and C. Calhoun, A dynamic analysis of adjustable- and fixed-rate mortgage 
termination,in “ASSA (AREUEA) Annual Meeting,” New Orleans (1997). 
 
7. J. V. Duca and S. S. Rosenthal, An empirical test of credit rationing in the mortgage 
market, Journal of Urban Economics, 29, 218–234 (1991). 
 
8. J. V. Duca and S. S. Rosenthal, Do mortgage rates vary based on household default 
characteristics? Evidence on rate sorting and credit rationing, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 8, 99–113 (1994). 
 
 19  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, Yezer 
 
9. M. F. Ferguson and S. R. Peters, What constitutes evidence of lending discrimination? 
Journal of Finance, 50, 739–748 (1995). 
 
10. S. A. Gabriel and S. S. Rosenthal, Credit rationing, race, and the mortgage market, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 29, 371–379 (1991). 
 
11. J. L. Goodman, Jr., and J. Nichols, Does FHA increase home ownership or just 
accelerate it? Journal of Housing Economics, 6, 184–202 (1997). 
 
12. P. H. Hendershott, W. C. LaFayette, and D. R. Haurin, Debt usage and mortgage choice: 
The FHA-conventional decision, Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 202–217 (1997). 
 
13. P. Linneman and S. Wachter, The impacts of borrowing constraints on homeownership, 
Real Estate Economics, 17, 389–402 (1989). 
 
14. D. S. Massey and N. A. Denton, The dimensions of residential segregation, Social 
Forces, 67, 281–315(1988). 
 
15. A. Pennington-Cross and J. Nichols, Credit history and the FHA-conventional choice, 
Real Estate Economics, 28, 307–336 (2000). 
 
16. J. Sa-Aadu and C. F. Sirmans, Differentiated contracts, heterogeneous borrowers, and 
the mortgage choice decision, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 27, 498–510 
(1995). 
 
17. W. B. Shear and A. Yezer, An indirect test for differential treatment of borrowers in urban 
mortgage markets, Real Estate Economics, 10, 405–420 (1983). 
 
18. United States General Accounting Office, Homeownership: Potential effects of reducing 
FHA’s insurance coverage for home mortgages, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 
on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
House of Representatives (1997). 
 
 20  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, Yezer 
 
19. J. C. Weicher, FHA reform: balancing public purpose and financial soundness, Journal 
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 5, 133–150 (1992). 
 
20. P. M. Zorn, The impact of mortgage qualification criteria on households’ housing 
decisions: An empirical analysis using microeconomic data. Journal of Housing 
Research, 3, 51–75 (1993). 
 
  
  
 
Appendi
 
Figure 1
F
ߙ
co
F
w
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
IG. 1. The F
൫Φ;Φେ൯ sha
nventional 
HA underwr
edge; S + T
HA wedge. 
re of FHA a
lending stan
iting standa
 = FHA end
ݎሺΦሻ ൌ	mar
pplicants at 
dards (Φେ);
rd; R = conv
orsements; 
ginal probab
a given risk
 Φେ ൌ conve
entional reje
Q = convent
21  A
ility function
 level indexe
ntional und
ctions; V =
ional endor
mbrose, Penn
 of applican
d by ߔ and
erwriting sta
 FHA rejecti
sements. 
ington-Cross, 
t’s risk; 
 current 
ndard;  Φ୊
ons; T = FH
Yezer 
 
ൌ 
A 
  
 
F
 
igure 2 
FIG. 
functio
level 
conve
conve
endor
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Maintain
n of applic
indexed by
ntional und
ntional reje
sements; Q 
 convention
ant’s risk; ߙ
 Φ  and c
erwriting s
ctions; V =
= conventio
al lending 
ሺΦ;Φେሻ ൌ s
urrent conv
tandard Φ୊
 FHA rejec
nal endorse
22  A
standards. 
hare of FH
entional le
ൌ FHA u
tions; T = 
ments. 
mbrose, Penn
ݎ	ሺΦሻ ൌ  ma
A applicants
nding stan
nderwriting 
FHA wedge
ington-Cross, 
rginal proba
 at a given
dards ൫Φେ൯
standard; 
; S + T =
Yezer 
bility 
 risk 
; 	Φେ 
R = 
FHA 
 
  
F
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
igure 3 
FIG. 3
functio
level i
	conve
conve
endor
 
 
. Loosen co
n of applica
ndexed by Φ
ntional und
ntional rejec
sements. 
nventional l
nt’s risk; ߙሺ
 and curren
erwriting sta
tions; V = F
ending stan
Φ;Φେሻ ൌ sh
t conventio
ndard; Φ୊ ൌ
HA rejection
23  A
dards. ݎሺΦሻ
are of FHA 
nal lending s
 FHA unde
s; T = FHA
mbrose, Penn
ൌ marginal
applicants a
tandards ൫Φ
rwriting stan
 wedge; S +
ington-Cross, 
 probability 
t a given ris
େ൯;	Φେ ൌ
dard; R = 
 T = FHA 
Yezer 
k 
 
  
 
T
 
 
 
 
T
 
able 1 
able 2 
 
24  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
 
  
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
able 3 
 
 
25  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
  
 
 
 
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
able 3, continued 
26  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
  
 
 
 
 
 
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
able 4 
27  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
able 5 
28  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
 
able 6 
29  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, 
 
Yezer 
